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LOSS LIMITATION AND INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM
TAX AFTER THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986:
EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION?
CARTER G. BISHOPt
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is one of the most fundamental reforms
of this country's tax system. With this legislation, Congress sought to
address the problems created by tax shelter activity, and to create a
more equitable distribution of the tax burden. This Article reviews the
Tax Reform Act's attempt to equitably allocate the tax burden by ana-
lyzing passive activity loss rules, income tax rate reductions and the
individual minimum tax, and concludes that the goal of paying a fair
share of the tax burden is not met.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, legislative decisions concerning
tax practice and tax policy have been affected by an increased
sensitivity to the importance of ensuring that every taxpayer
pay a fair share of tax liability. This concern results largely
from the confluence of several factors. First, prior to 1969
marginal taxable income in excess of $100,000 for married tax-
payers filing joint returns was taxed at a 70% rate. These mar-
ginal rates were generally perceived as unrealistically high,
thus encouraging many taxpayers to minimize tax liabilities by
sheltering income.' Second, interest rates were extremely
high in the late 1970's and early 1980's, and they remain his-
torically high. The high interest rates encourage taxpayers to
seek methods to defer payment of tax liability as long as possi-
ble. The deferral is tantamount to an interest free loan from
the government on the deferred tax liability. This combination
of high income tax and high interest rates is generally believed
to be at the bottom of the radical proliferation of tax shelter
activity, which is designed to exploit the deferral value of the
time value of money rules. 2
The panoramic tax system impact created by the prolifera-
tion of tax shelter activity is well beyond the scope and imagi-
nation of this article. System level concerns, however, revolve
around enormous revenue base deterioration and the general
threat of taxpayer malaise. The latter is created by a percep-
tion that the system is not functioning properly because many
taxpayers are not paying their fair share of taxes.
Congress has reacted to the problem in a piecemeal fashion
since 1969 by enacting specific legislative strikes which are
targeted to reduce the attractiveness of tax shelters to their
most significant consumer, the high-income taxpayer. In 1969,
1. See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2027.
2. See Canellos & Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and
Discount After 1982, 38 TAX L. REV. 565, 565-66 (1983).
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Congress reduced the maximum tax rate on marginal earned
income from 70% to 50%. 3 A complex new individual mini-
mum tax was also added in 1969. 4 In 1981, the maximum tax
rate of 50% was extended to all categories of income. 5 In
1982 and 1984, complex time value of money rules were en-
acted to minimize the advantage of deferring taxes through tax
shelters. 6
Notwithstanding these and many other reforms, tax shelter
activity continued to flourish, bringing our tax system to the
edge of disaster. Congress once again responded by enacting
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 1986").
7
TRA 1986 unquestionably represents one of the most funda-
mental reforms of the federal income tax system since 1913.
Its title does not do it justice, at least relative to previous tax
reform acts, which pale in comparison. As such, TRA 1986
once again demonstrates that those whose professions revolve
around interpretation of tax statutes are engaged in a most
challenging and mind-bending sport. Tax practitioners are
often led blindly into intellectual cul-de-sacs where poor pro-
fessional advice and malpractice lurk.
Although it has been heralded as the deliverer of our tax
system, is TRA 1986 really all that Congress promised or is it a
harbinger of future legislation? Certainly tax shelter activity
will be curbed, but at what hidden cost; and will every taxpayer
now pay a fair share? As will be discussed, TRA 1986 has a few
striking blemishes. Some classes of taxpayers, notably the
middle class, will no doubt pay more tax. However, the
wealthy class may still avoid paying a fair share and, in fact,
may even pay less tax than before TRA 1986. The wealthy may
still shelter their income and avoid even a minimum tax
3. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (83 Stat.) 509, 752.
4. Id., 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 623-30.
5. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (95 Stat.) 105, 135.
6. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat.) 324, 496-500; Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 41-45, 100 Stat. 2685. In May, 1986, the Treasury
proposed extremely detailed regulations treating various time value of money issues.
L.R. 189-84, 1 C.B. 820 (1986). See also Lokken, The Time Value of Money Rules, 42 TAX
L. REV. 1 (1986) (a comprehensive discussion of these rules).
7. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 2085.
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responsiblity. The solution to this problem may be nothing
short of more legislation. This possibility should cause us to
critically examine the legislative process that created tax shel-
ters in the first place and then spent nearly two decades un-
winding the mistakes. Hopefully, much has been learned.
To examine these issues more completely, several facets of
TRA 1986 will be analyzed: passive activity loss rules, income
tax rate reductions, and the individual minimum tax. The im-
pact of each of these factors on tax shelter activity will be ex-
plored as well as their collective and separate impact on the
equitable allocation of tax burdens among all taxpayers.
I. PASSIVE ACTIVITY Loss
The new passive activity loss rules are found in Section 469.8
In its conceptual form, Section 469 is designed to discourage
investment in tax shelter activities by taxpayers who anticipate
a passive relationship with, and activity level in, such tax shel-
ters. For this purpose, all investment activities are presumed
to be tax shelters if they produce losses in excess of income. 9
Investment is discouraged by placing limitations on the ability
of passive investors to use their passive shelter losses to offset
unrelated income from activity sources in which the taxpayer
actively participates. ' 0
Thus, Congress broadly designated groups of activities and
investments as either passive or active. Once an activity is cate-
gorized, Section 469 attempts to eliminate crossover netting of
income and losses between the two types of activities. For ex-
ample, losses from all passive activities may not be utilized to
offset or shelter income from active activities." t Categorizing
all activities as active or passive and preventing passive losses
from offsetting active income is clearly a positive step in dis-
couraging high-income professionals, who earn active salary
income, from sheltering that salary income with passive tax
shelter investment losses.
Congress created a third category of income described as
"portfolio income," a special form of passive income. This
8. See I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1987). Statutory references are to the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.
9. I.R.C. § 469(d) (West Supp. 1987).
10. I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1987).
11. I.R.C. § 469(a) (West Supp. 1987).
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distinction is an attempt to prevent those who earn their in-
come from passive sources, theoretically the wealthy, from
sheltering that special class of passive income with passive
losses. 12 In sum, these yeoman efforts do much to accomplish
their objective of curtailing tax shelter activity, yet there is
room for criticism in analyzing the specific detail of the
approach.
The passive-active categorization process creates two pri-
mary pools of income and loss. Although crossover netting is
proscribed between the two pools, netting rules are not ap-
plied within the pools on an activity-by-activity basis. Accord-
ingly, once two or more activities are categorized as passive,
losses from one passive activity may offset the income of an-
other, thereby permitting a taxpayer to shelter income.
The central distortion of Section 469 may well be this per-
missive netting within the passive activity pool. Moreover,
since activities are classified as passive or active for each sepa-
rate taxpayer, the passive pool netting process permits and,
therefore encourages, sheltering activity of passive losses
against passive income (with the sole exception of portfolio in-
come). It also encourages the generation of passive income to
offset unused or phased out passive losses. Those taxpayers
most capable of arranging their affairs to produce non-portfo-
lio passive income and then to shelter such income with pas-
sive losses are the wealthy-those least dependent on active,
salary income.
A. Legislative History
Before delving into a more detailed exploration of the statu-
tory mechanics of Section 469, an examination of early con-
gressional efforts in this area provides an illuminating
comparison of congressional insights on the subject of passive
losses even though such early thoughts did not materialize into
legislation. At a different point in time, Congress might have
dealt with the problem in a slightly different fashion.
Although Section 469 appears to be a creature of first im-
pression, history reveals that its roots can be traced to 1969,
and more specifically to 1976, when the House attempted to
12. I.R.C. § 469(e)(1) (West Supp. 1987) (certain income not treated as income
from passive activity).
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limit deductions of passive losses. The House, however, was
defeated by the Senate which opted exclusively for a minimum
tax approach to solve the early tax shelter abuse problem. In-
terestingly, it was the Senate which, after rejecting the House
approach in 1969 and 1976, ultimately proposed the Section
469 rules in TRA 1986. The 1986 House bill did not contain
any provisions attempting to limit passive losses.
13
1. Tax Reform Act of 1969
As early as 1969, Congress was concerned not only with spe-
cific tax shelter abuse, but also with the more general problem
of the ability of individuals to escape tax payment on their eco-
nomic income. 14 The House bill proposed Section 301 as part
of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 ("TRA 1969"). 15 The House
expressed concern that individuals with high economic income
resulting from the receipt of tax-exempt income, such as inter-
est income from exempt state and local bonds, might exclude
all income from tax. 16 The House was also concerned that
those with large amounts of capital gain income or those that
utilized accelerated depreciation on real estate might escape
tax on a large part of their economic income.17
The primary House weapon against such an abuse was an
attempt to broaden the definition of taxable income to bring it
more in line with conceptual economic income by placing a
limit on tax preferences ("LTP").I8 The goal of Section 301
was to include at least one-half of economic income in taxable
income. '9
Under the LTP approach, a 50% ceiling was imposed on in-
dividual's total income (adjusted gross income plus the tax
13. S. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 137, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4125.
14. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 77-78, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1724-25.
15. See id., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1724. Congress
passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969 with the Senate version of Section 301. Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (83
Stat.) 509, 623-30 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 56-58 (1969)).
16. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1724-27.
17. Id. at 78, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1725.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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preference items) which could be excluded from income. 20
The rule did not apply until total tax preferences exceeded
$10,000.21 For purposes of the rule, five items were targeted
tax preferences:
(1) tax-exempt interest;22
(2) the 50% portion of net long-term capital gains which
was excluded from income;
23
(3) the untaxed appreciation in the value of property that
was donated to charity, treated as a charitable contri-
bution and the subject of a deduction;
24
(4) the excess of accelerated real property depreciation
over the amount allowable under the straight-line
method; 25 and
(5) the net amount of farm loss for the year (as deter-
mined under the excess deduction account rules) that
exceeded what would have been allowed if the tax-
payer had utilized the inventory method of accounting
and had capitalized capital expenditures.
26
In addition to the $10,000 threshhold in tax preferences
before application of the rule, Section 301 contained two relief
measures. The bill provided for a five year carryover of disal-
lowed preferences and disallowed excess depreciation deduc-
tions attributable to real estate.27 The excess depreciation
deductions could then be utilized to increase the basis of the
assets to which they related.
The House also proposed Section 302, which operated in
20. Id. at 78-79, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1725.
21. Id. at 79, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1725-26.
22. Id., The tax-exempt interest limitation was to be phased-in over a ten-year
transitional period with one-tenth of such interest taken into account in the year be-
ginning January 1, 1970 and two-tenths the next year with repeating increases each
year. Moreover, the amount of interest to be taken into account was to be reduced by
the amount of any deductions attributable to such interest and disallowed under Sec-
tion 265. Id., 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1726.
23. Id.
24. Id. Sections 57(a)(5) and (6) added by TRA 1986 now treat specified tax-
exempt interest and untaxed appreciation on charitable contribution property as
items of tax preference for purposes of computing alternative minimum tax liability
under Section 55.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 79-80, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1726-27. Under this
approach, if some tax preferences were disallowed and included in income, then in
any succeeding five-year carryover period where the aggregate current year prefer-
ences were below the 50% limitation, then the disallowed preferences would be al-
lowed, thus reducing income.
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tandem with Section 301 to reduce the double tax benefit of
excluding tax-exempt income while permitting itemized de-
ductions which related to the excluded tax-exempt income.
The approach of Section 302 was to limit personal itemized
deductions by disallowing that portion of the itemized deduc-
tions which specifically related to tax-exempt income.28 Since
the income was not taxed, the related amount of itemized de-
ductions should not be deductible.
Under TRA 1969, individuals may have been subject to both
Sections 301 and 302. Thus, the taxpayer was to first apply the
Section 301 LTP Rule and next, under Section 302, to allocate
itemized deductions between adjusted gross income (as modi-
fied by Section 301) and allowed tax preferences. 29
Although concerned with the identical problems that trou-
bled the House, the Senate chose to substitute an overall mini-
mum tax. The Senate rationalized that a minimum tax would
be more effective and considerably simpler than the House ap-
proach. 30 With slight modification, the Senate approach was
adopted. 31
The Senate approach noted three significant drawbacks to
the House approach. 32 First, combined use of the LTP and the
allocation of deductions rules were projected to produce dif-
ferent tax burdens on preference income for two individuals
with the same preference income but different taxable in-
come. 33 Second, the inclusion of both regular and preference
income in the same base was predicted to produce enormous
complexity because of the way the LTP was calculated. 34 Fi-
nally, the House approach would not apply to corporations
and therefore would not reach the preference income enjoyed
by that group.3 5
The Senate criticism of the House approach seems spurious.
It is unclear why it makes a difference that the House approach
28. Id. at 81, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1728.
29. Id. at 83, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1730.
30. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2143.
31. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 277, 287, reprinted in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS 2392, 2402.
32. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 112-13, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2143-44.
33. Id., 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2144.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 113, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2147.
[Vol. 14
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would yield different results for taxpayers with identical prefer-
ence income but dissimilar taxable income. The House ap-
proach represents a tax on the overall economic income of a
taxpayer. If two taxpayers have unequal economic income, it
should not be surprising that their tax liabilities differ. More-
over, the Senate's minimum tax approach could hardly have
been classified as a simplification measure. Accordingly, it is
doubtful that the Senate approach was less complex than the
House approach. Finally, the House LTP could have easily
been extended to corporations in a modified form.
Nevertheless, the Senate view prevailed and the minimum
tax was born at the expense of the House approach which was
directly aimed at limiting tax preference use. In theory, the
House approach was a direct attack on tax shelter use whereas
the Senate approach merely raised the cost of excessive
sheltering.
2. Tax Reform Act of 1976
As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 ("TRA 1976"),36 the
House once more attempted to directly limit preferential de-
ductions. This effort, as opposed to the general effort in 1969,
was specifically directed at selected tax shelter activities and
was described as a limitation on artificial losses ("LAL").3 7
One of the major goals of the House bill was to improve the
equity of our tax system by reducing the undesirable effects of
a tax-directed resource allocation system.3 8
The House bill reflected the position that the success of the
income tax system is based on a high degree of voluntary com-
pliance since only a small portion of tax returns are actually
audited. Voluntary compliance is in turn premised on taxpay-
ers understanding the relevant tax laws and forms and believ-
ing that others are also paying a fair share of the overall tax
burden. As such, the House was concerned that the ability of
selected high-income taxpayers to utilize certain tax provisions
36. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (90 Stat.) 1520.
37. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2897, 2904.
38. Id. at 7, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2901-02. Presumably,
once tax benefits were removed from a favored activity, investment resources would
be directed more toward industries and activities based upon their non-tax economic
return factors.
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was unfair.3 9 The specific provisions causing concern were
those intended as business investment incentives but used as
tax shelters.
40
The House bill sought measures believed to be effective in
ensuring that those with a high economic income would bear a
reasonable share of the overall tax burden.4' In solving this
problem, the House bill once again turned its attention to tax
preferences and, in particular, to tax shelters.
The House bill recognized that the income tax system's dual
role, to promote economic growth and encourage various
kinds of social behavior, led to complexity, economic ineffi-
ciency, and taxpayer tax treatment inequality.
It has generally been recognized that the tax system is a tool
which can be used to promote economic efficiency and
growth, and this has led Congress to enact a large number
of tax provisions designed to promote certain activities and
discourage others. These tax preferences, however, can
outlive their usefulness or can have adverse effects on other
goals, such as tax equity and simplicity. Your committee be-
lieves that these special tax incentives should be reviewed
periodically, and this bill is an important step in that
process.42
The House bill targeted tax shelters as the greatest villain
since they are understandably the heaviest users of tax prefer-
ences. 43 In addition, the 1969 minimum tax was strengthened
by lowering the exemption amount, raising the minimum tax
rate, and halving the deduction for tax preference items. 44 To
coordinate minimum tax reform with tax shelter reform, the
House exempted from minimum tax any deductions that were
limited under tax shelter reform.45
In this round, the House attack on tax preferences differed
significantly from the 1969 combined approach of limiting tax
preferences and disallowing itemized deductions related to the
tax-exempt income. The 1969 approach was directed at limit-
ing the use of tax preferences at the individual taxpayer level.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 8, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2902-03.
43. See id. at 8-9, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2903-04.
44. Id. at 10, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2904.
45. See id., 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2905.
[Vol. 14
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The 1976 attack directed its emphasis and focus more on the
business or activity generating the tax preferences. This is
substantially closer to the model that the Senate used as part of
TRA 1986.
The 1976 House bill noted the explosive growth of tax shel-
ters in which individuals utilized artificial deductions to gener-
ate losses which were in turn utilized to offset unrelated
income. 46 The House made several interesting observations
about tax shelters. First, the House noted that tax shelters
were economically inefficient and wasteful because large por-
tions of capital raised were often not invested in the targeted
industry but were paid to promoters of the shelter as a fee.
47
Second, the House conceded that in some ways tax shelters
were positive because they were usually the result of special tax
provisions designed to serve worthwhile purposes, such as di-
recting capital into certain vital industries. 48 As such, the ap-
proach of the House bill was to maintain the underlying tax
preference as an industry-wide incentive but to limit its use as a
tax shelter device to shelter unrelated income of investors.
These artificial deductions which sheltered unrelated income
resulted in essentially a "negative tax," where income unre-
lated to the activity is exempt as well as income generated from
the activity. For example, unrelated salary income could be
sheltered. The House bill expressed concern that negative
taxation on income from tax shelter investments constituted
too great a tax preference.
49
3. 1976 LAL Approach
The House bill considered several techniques to accomplish
46. Id. at 8, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2903 (artificial deductions
were defined as "ones that do not accurately reflect their current expenses").
47. Id. If this was a principal concern, presumably measures could have been
taken to restrict payments to promoters. For example, elimination of a deduction for
any payments to promoters in any form and limitations on amounts paid to the pro-
moter while still allowing the underlying activity to qualify for preferential deduc-
tions would have raised the after-tax cost of such payments and certainly discouraged
them.
48. Id. at 9, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2903.
49. Id., 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 2904. Of course, the negative
tax in most contexts was an expression of deferral. Since the taxpayer's basis in the
activity was being reduced, the negative tax would be repaid when the investment was
sold. In some cases, the tax would be repaid at a lower capital gain rate than that
which generated the ordinary income negative tax.
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its goal of eliminating the negative tax aspect of tax shelters
but selected LAL as the most promising. 50 Under the LAL ap-
proach, artificial deductions such as accelerated depreciation,
intangible drilling expenses, prepaid feed expenses, and con-
struction period interest and taxes would be allowed only
against related income. 51 As an example, accelerated deprecia-
tion on a building would be allowed only to the extent of in-
come from real estate; it would not be available to reduce tax
liability on unrelated income such as an owner's or investor's
wage or salary income. 52
The LAL provisions were subjectively imposed upon tax
shelter investments in real estate, farm operations, oil and gas,
motion picture films, equipment leasing, and professional
sports franchises. 53 Although the bill was viewed as a part of
an ongoing reform, 54 it was believed that these shelter areas
were the most important targets.55 Absent an attack on the
major shelter areas, the House believed that the bill would
simply encourage taxpayers to redirect their sheltering activity
to more favorable areas. 56 At the bottom, the bill attempted to
reduce shelter abuse associated with negative tax while leaving
the underlying preference in place.
Nevertheless, it was believed that there still existed substan-
tial tax preference for investments in oil and gas, and real es-
tate.57 Although the bill prevented artificial losses in the
preferential activities from off-setting unrelated income, the in-
come from the investment itself was still preferentially
sheltered.
Under the LAL approach, specified accelerated deductions
were not allowed in the taxable year in which the deductions
were paid or incurred to the extent that they exceeded a tax-
payer's net income from that activity. These losses were de-
ferred until either the taxpayer had income from that activity in
a future taxable year or until the taxpayer disposed of the
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 27-28, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2921.
54. Id. at 8, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2903.
.55. See id. at 9, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2904.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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property. 58 This approach did not limit true economic losses.
In order to properly confine the use of preferential acceler-
ated deductions to the property or activity generating them,
the House bill utilized the concept of net related income.59 In
the real estate area, for example, net related income estab-
lished the amount of accelerated deductions which could be
taken in a taxable year. Net related income was defined as the
gross income from real property less the sum of the ordinary
deductions attributable to the entire class of real property. But
if any one property produced an economic loss (ordinary de-
ductions in excess of gross income), then that loss would be
allowed .60
Effective dates of the proposed LAL provisions depended
upon the type of property involved. In the case of real estate,
the LAL provisions applied only prospectively to real property
actually constructed after the effective date of the bill.61
Notwithstanding the extremely detailed position of the
House bill, the Senate, as it did in 1969, decided to delete the
LAL approach because of its perceived complexity and adverse
economic impact. 62 The Conference Committee supported
the deletion.63 The Senate expressed concern for the com-
plexity that LAL would create because of the need for taxpay-
ers to keep records spanning several years in order to track
deferred deductions.6 4 Complexity would also develop be-
cause of the need to distinguish related income from other in-
come. The Senate believed that the determination of related
income would be particularly difficult when the LAL was ap-
plied on a property-by-property basis. 65
On the economic impact issue, the Senate believed that LAL
failed to properly distinguish between abusive tax shelters66
58. Id. at 28, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2921-22.
59. Id. at 34, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2928.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 37, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2930.
62. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3439, 3475.
63. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 408, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4118, 4119.
64. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3475.
65. Id.
66. Abusive tax shelters are economically inefficient investments which are un-
dertaken purely for tax reasons.
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and legitimate situations where tax incentives provide impor-
tant encouragement to economically worthwhile invest-
ments.67  The Senate expressed concern that the LAL
approach would unintentionally eliminate many productive in-
vestments. 68 This would not be a desirable result because of
high unemployment, a housing shortage, and foreign energy
dependence. 69 Accordingly, the Senate approach of strength-
ening the minimum tax, expanding the maximum tax, and spe-
cifically targeting tax shelter abuse provisions prevailed.
70
4. Tax Reform Act of 1986
Regardless of the wisdom of the 1976 Senate position in re-
jecting LAL and relying primarily upon a stronger minimum
tax, history has vindicated the House LAL approach. In 1986,
the Senate, after consistently rejecting House loss activity pro-
67. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3475.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 399, 407, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4118, 4118.
In general, the Senate expansion of the minimum tax on individuals included
raising the rate from 10% to 15%, lowering the exemption to a maximum of $5,000,
and adding several new preferences to the base of the tax. These preferences include
construction period interest, accelerated intangible drilling costs, excess investment
interest over investment income, excess itemized deductions (other than medical ex-
penses and casualty losses) over 60% of adjusted gross income, and accelerated de-
preciation on all leased property. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 110, 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3445-46. The maximum tax rate of 50% was
expanded to include a limited amount of investment income. In addition, income
eligible for the maximum tax rate was to be reduced by all tax preferred income in
order to discourage tax shelter investment. Id. at 3, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3440.
Finally, specific provisions were contemplated to eliminate abusive tax shelters.
First, losses from accelerated deductions incurred in farm operations, film purchases,
equipment leasing, and oil and gas drilling (real estate was excluded) were limited to
the amount that the taxpayer had at risk. Second, the recapture rules for real estate
and professional sport franchises were expanded. Finally, rules were advanced to
restrict the use of limited partnerships to syndicate tax shelter benefits as well as limit
deductions for prepaid expenses. Id.
The Conference Agreement adopted a slightly modified approach for minimum
tax expansion by eliminating construction period interest and excess investment in-
terest as preference items and reducing tax exemption to the greater of $10,000 or
one-half of the regular tax liability. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1515 at 426, 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4136. The report adopted the maximum tax provi-
sions. Id. at 428, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4138. It also generally
adopted the tax shelter provisions. Id. at 411-15, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 4122-26.
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posals in favor of amending the minimun tax provisions, pro-
posed the pervasive new passive loss rules. 7' The purpose of
the rules was to limit the deductibility of losses against unre-
lated income where the taxpayer is not materially participating
in the operations.7 2
Statutorily, the new passive loss rules are embodied in the
new Section 469. Section 469 is an express legislative re-
sponse to the proliferation of tax shelters which had obviously
not been cured by various legislative efforts since 1969. The
legislative efforts included reducing the maximum tax rate, ex-
panding the minimum tax, and decreasing preferential treat-
ment of tax incentives in tax shelter areas through specifically
designed provisions. 73
Extensive tax shelter abuses were contributing to public con-
cern that the tax system was unfair because tax was paid by
only the unsophisticated and the naive. The Senate noted that
this perception not only undermines voluntary compliance, but
also encourages proliferation of the tax shelter market. 74 This
in turn diverts investment capital from economically produc-
tive activities to those principally or exclusively serving tax
avoidance goals.75 Thus, more effective methods were needed
than those relied upon in past years to curb tax shelter activity
expansion.
The Senate contemplated eliminating substantially all tax
preferences, but this was deemed unwise since many prefer-
ences were believed to be socially or economically beneficial
and it was deemed impossible to design a tax system that mea-
sured income perfectly. 76 When a comprehensive tax base is
designed, it is by nature extremely complex. This creates
problems of both compliance and administration; however,
71. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. II, 137, reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 4075, 4225.
72. Id. The Section 469 passive activity loss rules originated in the Senate bill.
The House did not contain a similar provision. Id.
73. See generally S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 713-18 (1986), reprinted in
1986-3 C.B. vol. 3, 713-18. The Senate noted that taxpayers were quickly losing faith
in their tax system, primarily because of high marginal tax rates (50% for a single
taxpayer with taxable income in excess of $88,270) and because of taxpayers shelter-
ing income from one source with tax shelter deductions and credits from a wholly
unrelated source. Id. at 713, 1986-3 C.B. vol. 3 at 713.
74. Id. at 714, 1986-3 C.B. vol. 3 at 714.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 715, 1986-3 C.B. vol. 3 at 715.
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where simpler rules are used, opportunities for manipulation
exist. Taxpayers can design techniques to undermeasure or
defer income.
In orchestrating the 1986 attack on tax shelters, the Senate,
as the House did in 1976, distinguished between preferences
confined to an industry use and those that created opportuni-
ties for outside investors to avoid tax liabilities on unrelated
income of the preferential industry. Thus, the Senate distin-
guished between income of those investors who are active in a
trade or business and those who are not active. The Senate's
approach was to maintain the existence of tax preferences but
confine their use against related active income and limiting
their use against unrelated passive income. The Senate be-
lieved that the industries targeted for the tax preferences
would still be benefited, but the preferences would not create
the feared negative tax that the House discussed in 1976.
77
The Senate indicated that in order for tax preferences to
function as intended, their benefit must be directed primarily
toward the taxpayers who have a substantial and bona fide in-
volvement in the preference activity. 78 It was believed that
such a limitation would still encourage non-participating inves-
tors to invest in targeted preference activities even though they
could not shelter unrelated income since the preferences
would reduce the rate of tax on the targeted industry income
vis-a-vis other non-targeted industry income.
79
To determine which investors would qualify, the Senate
chose a material participation standard. Under this standard, a
taxpayer's participation in an activity was examined to deter-
mine whether the taxpayer could use the tax benefits from that
activity. The Senate indicated that the more significant the
participation, the more likely the investor would approach an
investment decision with non-tax economic profit motiva-
tion.80 A more passive investor was believed to seek a return
on capital, including returns in the form of reductions on taxes
owed on unrelated income, rather than a continuing source of
livelihood. 8'
77. See id. at 715-16, 1986-3 C.B. vol. 3 at 715-16.
78. Id. at 716, 1986-3 C.B. vol. 3 at 716.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id. This is accomplished by the preferential industry paying a lower rate of
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With respect to non-participating investors, the Senate be-
lieved it would be appropriate to postpone recognition of
losses exceeding the income of the activity until the investor's
ultimate disposition of the interest in the activity. 82 According
to the Senate, the annual effort to measure real economic loss
from passive activities prior to disposition created distortion.
This is particularly due to the non-taxation of unrealized a-
preciation and the mismatching of tax deductions and related
economic income. This result was magnified where debt fi-
nancing was utilized. The Senate realized that it is not possible
to determine whether or not a true loss has been sustained un-
til the taxpayer actually disposes of the interest.
83
B. Section 469 Passive Loss Rules
1. Introduction
Accordingly, the passive activity loss ("PAL") rules gov-
erned by Section 469 were born. Section 469(a) denies an in-
dividual from currently deducting a PAL. Section 469(d)
defines a PAL as the amount by which the aggregate losses
from all passive activities for the taxable year (including PAL
carryovers) exceed the aggregate income from all passive activ-
ities for such year.84 Section 469(b) allows any such disallowed
PAL to be carried forward indefinitely. 85 Section 469(c) de-
fines passive activity as any activity which involves the conduct
of any trade or business in which the taxpayer does not materi-
ally participate. 86 Section 469(h)(1) defines material participa-
tion as a regular, continuous, and substantial involvement in
the operations of the activity. 87 Any rental activity and any lim-
ited partnership interest are treated as passive activities under
Sections 469(c)(2) and 469(h)(2) regardless of the level of the
taxpayer's participation in the rental or other limited partner-
tax on its income than a non-preferential industry because the preferential industry
has greater preferential deductions. The problem with this notion is that, by defini-
tion, most tax shelter concerns were non-taxpaying, pass through, entities that pro-
duced losses well in excess of income. In the non-tax shelter industry, this concept
may have viability.
82. See id. at 717, 1986-3 C.B. vol. 3 at 717.
83. Id.
84. I.R.C. § 469(d) (West Supp. 1987).
85. I.R.C. § 469(b) (West Supp. 1987).
86. I.R.C. § 469(c) (West Supp. 1987).
87. I.R.C. § 469(h)(1) (West Supp. 1987).
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ship activity."" Finally, Section 469(g) permits the PAL to be
ultimately used against unrelated income or gain when the en-
tire interest in the activity is disposed of in a fully taxable
transaction.8 9
Section 469(h) deals with the retroactivity of the provisions.
Unlike the 1976 House LAL rules which were applicable only
prospectively, 90 Section 469 is partially retroactive. 91 In es-
sence, if the interest in the passive activity was being actively
conducted on August 16, 1986 (a pre-enactment interest), then
only the following portion of the PAL related to such an inter-
est shall be considered a PAL for purposes of Section 469:
35% - 1987; 60% - 1988; 80% - 1989; 90% - 1990; and 100%
thereafter.92
2. Analysis of the Passive Loss Rules
The impact of TRA 1986 and Section 469 is clear. Except
with regard to pre-enactment interests, when Section 469 ap-
plies it creates a deferred loss which can only be used against
related income until the interest is finally disposed of in a fully
taxable transaction. Thus, the use of losses exceeding related
income from such activities is deferred. When combined with
o ther provisions of TRA 1986, which lower the effective indi-
vidual income tax rate to 28% in 1988 and raise the maximum
capital gain rate from 20% to 28%, Congress has eliminated
the two key return elements of tax benefits. Deferral and con-
version benefits have been eliminated. Such benefits were cre-
ated by taking tax shelter deductions against ordinary income
in early years and paying those deductions back at a lower capi-
tal gain rate in a later year when the interest is sold.
In attacking deferral and conversion tax shelter benefits,
Congress will no doubt stem the tide of the swelling tax shelter
market, an admirable goal at the least. The larger tax policy
question must deal, however, with the casualty list. Ultimately,
an examination of those taxpayers who are the casualties
strikes at the fairness of Section 469.
Section 469(g) reflects the position that, with respect to non-
88. I.R.C. § 469(c)(2), (h)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
89. I.R.C. § 4 69(g) (West Supp. 1987).
90. I.R.C. § 469(h) (West Supp. 1987).
91. See I.R.C. § 469(a), (d) (West Supp. 1987).
92. I.R.C. § 469(d) (West Supp. 1987).
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participating investors, it is appropriate to treat business activ-
ity losses as not realized prior to the ultimate disposition of the
interest in the activity. The obvious difficulties in measuring
real economic losses from passive activities, including adminis-
trative enforcement and accuracy measurement, give rise to
distortions of various magnitudes related to both the non-taxa-
tion of unrealized appreciation in the assets of the activity and
the mismatch of deductions and related economic income. Of
course, this is not newsworthy. It has always been recognized
that true overall gain or loss from an investment is never
known for certain until the investment is liquidated. More-
over, such appears to be the case in any activity, regardless of
the presence or absence of passive or active investors.
What is newsworthy is that Congress has decided that the
cost of these uncertainties, although justifiable at one point in
time, are simply not acceptable if their cost includes prolifera-
tion of unwanted tax shelters. Accordingly, the benefits are
being limited in the sense that they may not be utilized to off-
set investors' income, such as salary and interest, that is func-
tionally unrelated to the activity. The thought is that these
benefits would be allowed to continue for only those investors
who are active in the businesses to which preferences were di-
verted. The overall goal is to confine the use of preferential
deductions to income generated from the related activity.
The material participation standard's premise may be
flawed, though, whether or not it accomplishes its intended
purpose. Assuming the validity of the tax preference, it can
certainly be argued that some social and economic goals are
achieved if particular tax preference investments are made re-
gardless of who makes the investment or how much of the in-
vestors' income is sheltered. In this case, the amount of tax
liability which an investor shelters is not logically related to
whether or not the tax preference is valid. This analysis relates
to a separate and arguably unrelated policy goal. On the other
hand, it appears perfectly clear that if the goal is to stay or slow
the flow of tax shelters, then the material participation stan-
dard will accomplish that goal.
For example, if Congress decides that more low income
housing is needed and, to accomplish that goal, more private
capital investment is necessary, then Congress may encourage
private capital investment in low income housing by creating
1988]
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special tax deductions which will increase the after-tax rate of
return of such an investment. The issue of whether the inves-
tor is active or passive in the investment seems irrelevant. If a
secondary goal is to prevent those who are primarily engaged
in other occupations unrelated to operations of low income
housing (such as lawyers, doctors, and business executives)
from sheltering income earned in their principal occupations
from investment losses incurred in a low income housing pro-
ject, then the material participation standard will certainly ac-
complish that goal.
Unfortunately, Section 469 will most certainly achieve the
latter result by simultaneously discouraging investment in ac-
tivities that generate passive losses. These activities are gen-
erally the very activities blessed with tax preferences. In fact, it
could be argued that traditionally those service providers who
are actively involved in the business do not ordinarily provide
the capital for the venture. The material participation limita-
tion could mean that available investment capital for passive
investors will nearly or entirely expire in the traditional prefer-
ence investment areas until their non-tax rates of return more
nearly resemble other competitive investment choices.
The counter argument is that the TRA 1986, itself, generally
removes tax consideration from investment decisions by lower-
ing the tax rate. As the argument goes, an investor should be
less interested in sheltering income that is taxed at a 28% rate
as opposed to that taxed at a 50% rate. This may beg the
question, however, that since the shelter tax rate is lowered for
all investments the desire to shelter income may continue to
exist. After all, 28% of a large income is still a large number
when compared to zero.
The unstated assumption regarding tax preferences prior to
TRA 1986 was that certain investments with lower pre-tax eco-
nomic returns would not be made without the tax preferences
which increased the after-tax yield. This assumption remains
equally valid after TRA 1986. Assuming investor sophistica-
tion, it is difficult to see why an investor would deliberately
choose an investment with a lower after-tax rate of return. If
this is true, the pre-TRA 1986 preference investments will suf-
fer heavily after TRA 1986 until, or if, the non-tax intrinsic
economic return factors (most notably, cash flow and apprecia-
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tion) sufficiently increase through market forces to counter
balance the withdrawal of the pre-TRA 1986 tax preference.
Thus, in the long run, it remains to be seen whether or not
the tax decrease for renters of apartment units, for example,
will ultimately translate into a rent increase which will increase
the investment's cash flow. It could be argued that new multi-
ple unit housing will not be built until the investment commu-
nity perceives a market rate of return that is not currently
available absent preferential tax treatment. The withdrawal of
tax preferences could cause a building shortage which would
allow consumer rental demand for units to outpace supply.
The result would be a rent increase, with new units being built
only after the rent increases occur.
93
In the short run, other behavior may occur. In fact, since
Section 469(c)(1) allows passive activity losses to offset passive
activity income, market forces may demand passive activity in-
come (passive income generators ("PIG")) which could be pro-
vided, for example, from unleveraged real estate investment.
Unleveraged real estate investment would produce taxable in-
come because of the absence of the interest deduction on the
leverage. Promoters may be able to market this type of invest-
ment unit to absorb unused passive activity losses. In that
case, real estate investment analysis would again be made
based upon tax consequences and not economic market forces,
a result clearly not contemplated by TRA 1986.
Moreover, the passive activity loss limitation rule does not
fully address its intended purpose of ensuring that all taxpay-
ers with substantial income pay their fair share of tax. This is
because the aggregation principle of Section 469(c)(1) is too
liberal. To be perfectly accurate, the rule should be restated as
a per-activity rule with very narrow definitions of activities. In
each activity, taxpayers should be allowed deductions only for
cash losses, and even those losses should not be offset against
other income until the investment is ultimately liquidated. It
could be argued that, to be fair, if all passive income is to be
taxed then all passive losses must be allowed as a deduction.
To some extent this would simply be a casualty of tax reform if
the per-activity rule were adopted.
93. See Johnson, Financial Impact of the 1986 Act on Real Estate Investments - A View
From the Spreadsheets, 36 TAx NOTES 309 (1987) (for an excellent discussion concern-
ing the impact of TRA 1986 on the value of real estate).
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To illustrate the potential effectiveness of the aggregate
principle, assume that a model taxpayer, a physician, had
wisely invested in a Subchapter S corporation two years ago.
The corporation was engaged in the active conduct of the busi-
ness of manufacturing and selling shoes, but the taxpayer has
not and will not materially participate in that business. As-
sume also that in 1988, the business made a taxable profit of
$2,000,000, of which $1,000,000 was the taxpayer's distributa-
ble share. Assume that the taxpayer has retired, has no other
income, and buys leveraged real estate rental properties that
generate $1,000,000 of tax losses at a break even cash flow.
Since Section 469(c)(1) treats both the loss activity and the in-
come activity as passive and aggregates the two, this taxpayer
with substantial economic income will pay no tax, assuming
that the minimum tax rules (discussed infra) do not apply.
Thus, the Section 469(c)(1) aggregation principle result may
be continued tax relief for the very wealthy. In fact, when the
impact of Section 469(c)(1) is combined with a cut in the top
tax rate from 50% to 28%, the ultimate unintended benefi-
ciaries of TRA 1986 will be precisely the wealthy group that
was intended to be hit harder by the passive activity loss limita-
tion rules and the revised alternative minimum tax. Only the
sheltering limitations on portfolio income discussed above may
be effective in ensuring that the wealthy do not shelter sub-
stantial economic income.
Finally, even assuming that Section 469 is a good idea, the
transition rules which implement the initial impact of the stat-
ute are the best statement of the statute's basic lack of fair-
ness.9 4 Inevitably, tax reform involves basic notions of fairness
in the transition from pre-tax reform to post-tax reform. It is
on this mark that Section 469 scores very poorly. Congress
simply thought too little of the problem of protecting the reli-
ance interests of those taxpayers who justifiably relied on pre-
TRA 1986 law in making their pre-TRA 1986 investment
decisions.
The Section 469(i) transitional rules phase the impact of the
passive loss disallowance in over time. From 1987 through
1990, the percentage of passive activity loss that is disallowed
is 35%-1987, 60%-1988, 80%-1989, 90%-1990, and 100%
94. See generally Sheppard, Transition Rules: But W'e've Always Done It That Way, 33
TAX NOTES 393 (1986).
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thereafter. 95 In contrast, the 1976 House LAL approach was
exclusively prospective, for example, only applying to real es-
tate constructed after the proposed enactment date.
96
When enacting the Section 469(e) carryover provisions
which allow unlimited carryover and use of prior years' disal-
lowed excess passive activity loss, Congress argued that most
current investors will ultimately be able to fully utilize their un-
used losses against income from the sale of the activity,97 thus
the impact will be reduced. In addition, the lower phase-out
rules in earlier years of Section 469 reflect the principle that
most current losses will be deductible because most deduc-
tions occur in the early years of an activity. Finally, Congress
believed that the deferred loss rules of Section 469 was a small
compensation for a top marginal rate reduction from 50% to
28%.
These arguments may not be adequate compensation for in-
vestors who made decisions based upon pre-TRA 1986 tax
law. Even though the transitional carryover rules may allow
the pre-TRA 1986 investor to ultimately utilize the tax advan-
tages, the future purchaser of the passive activity's asset will
not be entitled, after TRA 1986, to utilize the same or similar
tax advantages that existed pre-TRA 1986. Consequently, the
after-tax yield of owning the passive activity asset will drop af-
ter TRA 1986. Hence, the value of the asset itself will theoreti-
cally drop. In summary, the asset will be worth less to the new
buyer after TRA 1986 than it was to the current owner who
purchased it prior to TRA 1986. Consequently, Section 469
may not avoid temporary massive value decays in tax prefer-
enced assets such as real estate. The burden of this valuation
decay is borne by the taxpayer who owned the real estate when
TRA 1986 was enacted.
II. RATE REDUCTION AND ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX
Since the Section 469 passive activity loss rules are a crea-
ture of TRA 1986 vintage, the prospective impact of the rules
is somewhat speculative. In contrast, minimum tax and margi-
95. I.R.C. § 469(i)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
96. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2897, 2930.
97. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt II, 143, 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4231.
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nal tax rate reduction efforts have been in place since 1969 as
the two primary congressional attack weapons against tax shel-
ter abuse. The other purpose of these efforts was to generally
enhance the perceived fairness of a tax system in which every
taxpayer pays a fair share.
The advent of TRA 1986 promises to make Section 469 the
principal tax shelter weapon of the future, particularly when
supported by rate reductions. What then does the future hold
for the even tougher minimum tax rules and what impact can
we generally expect from the TRA 1986 rate reduction efforts?
In examining these questions, a watchful eye should be fixed
on the wealthy class to determine if these two provisions will
ensure that this class of taxpayers pays its fair share of the tax
burden. Unfortunately, the discussion below presents scena-
rios in which these two provisions, as the Section 469 rules dis-
cussed above do, operate ineffectively and yield unintended
results when applied to wealthy taxpayers. In fact, as will be
shown, many wealthy taxpayers may be substantially better off
after TRA 1986 than they were before it was passed.
A. Rate Reduction
As part of TRA 1969, Congress added Section 1348 to re-
duce the maximum tax rate on earned income from 70% to
50%.98 Section 1348 was not adopted as a tax relief measure
but rather to reduce the pressure for the use of tax loopholes.
Congress noted that a major taxpayer motivation was to pro-
tect earned income taxed at the 70% rate by creating artificial
losses or converting the earned income into capital gains. 99
Although the effort was criticized as overly complex, ineffec-
tive, and poorly drafted, 0 0 the statute was broadened in 1976
to include unearned income.' 0' Also, as part of the Economic
98. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 804, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS (83 Stat.) 509, 752.
99. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 208, reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1864.
100. See Coven, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Proving Again That Two Wrongs Do Not
Make A Right, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1093, 1119 (1980). "Under the alternative tax, de-
ductions and credits are divided into seven different categories producing a multi-
tude of different limitations. . . . It seems improbable that any objective of the
alternative tax requires such a complex mosaic." Id.
101. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3439, 3551 (the definition of income eligble for the
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Reform Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA"), 10 2 the top marginal tax
rate on all income was scaled back from 70% to 50%.103 Fi-
nally, as part of TRA 1986, the top effective rate was reduced
to 28%, effective for taxable years beginning in 1988.104
It remains to be seen just how effective the 28% top margi-
nal rate will be in curbing tax shelters. One certainly would
have to forecast little success, particularly if past rate reduction
efforts are at all indicative. As stated, the advent of the Section
469 PAL rules are likely to overshadow this latest round of rate
reduction in curbing tax shelter abuses.
The massive rate reductions of TRA 1986 were not achieved
without cost. In an effort to reduce the economic and social
engineering aspects of our tax system, Congress made massive
rate cuts with the intent that tax reform in 1986 would be close
to revenue neutral over a five-year period.10 5 Massive tax rate
cuts coupled with income neutrality translate into a broaden-
ing of the income tax base. If Congress intends to reduce the
marginal tax rate and still collect the same amount of tax reve-
nue, simple mathematics dictate that the tax base must be suffi-
ciently expanded to compensate for the rate reduction.
Under these circumstances, one really has to wonder if a rate
reduction is truly effective. Admittedly, early taxpayer percep-
tions will be favorable, but these perceptions are likely to
change when tax returns are filed and taxpayers as a whole un-
derstand that rate reduction does not necessarily translate into
a tax cut in their personal circumstances. In fact, the opposite
may occur. Revenue neutrality does not prevent tax burden
redistribution. If the burden is redistributed, some taxpayers
will pay less and some will pay more. Since a major goal of
TRA 1986 is to remove the economically disadvantaged from
the tax roles1 06 and the wealthy class may pay less, then middle
50% maximum marginal tax rate was expanded to a limited portion of net invest-
ment income).
102. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-134, § 101, 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEWS (95 Stat.) 105.
103. Id., 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 135.
104. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4075, 4092.
105. H.R. REP. No. 248, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 62-63. Over the period between
1986-1990, the committee tax reform bill is predicted to be nearly revenue neutral.
During that five-year period total revenues are estimated to be reduced by $364 mil-
lion, less than 0.1% of total estimated tax revenues. Id.
106. See STAFF OFJoINT COMMriTEE ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
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class taxpayers will pay more. After all, who could be more
delighted with tax reform than a wealthy taxpayer with largely
passive income and few deductions when the effective tax rate
plummets from 50% to 28%?
In 1969, when the House first proposed and succeeded in
injecting a Section 1348 maximum tax of 50% on earned in-
come, the Senate rejected the House effort but lost the battle
in conference. 10 7 The Senate reasoned that a drop to 50% re-
moved the critical element of substantial progressivity inherent
in a fair tax system. 0 8 Thus, one can only wonder whether the
new 15% and 28% tax rate system contains enough progres-
sivity to withstand similar upward spiralling pressures from
budget and other political fronts. Many taxpayers no doubt
sense that a future tax rate increase is in the offering when the
real winners and losers of TRA 1986 rate reduction are known.
B. Minimum Tax
1. Introduction
Minimum tax provisions have been no less curious and cer-
tainly less effective in curbing tax shelter abuse than their rate
reduction counterpart. What is in store for minimum tax pro-
visions which were substantially modified in TRA 1986? This
question becomes particularly important since TRA 1986 re-
duced the regular tax effective rate to 28%, and the minimum
tax rate on a broadened tax base to 20%. The effectiveness of
a minimum tax becomes particularly questionable as the gap
between the regular tax rates and minimum tax rates narrow.
The issue arises whether a maximum 8% gap between the reg-
ular and minimum tax rates justifies the complexity and com-
pliance problems created by the parallel two-track regular and
minimum tax system. This is particularly so since, as will be
shown below, the minimum tax is fatally flawed by the same
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 8 (Joint Comm. Print 1986) (the com-
mittee tried to design the code provisions to equitably distribute the tax relief based
on the consideration that fairness is needed in the tax treatment of low and middle
income taxpayers).
107. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 329, reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2392, 2444 (the conference generally followed the
House 50% rate limit on earned income, but limited earned income to that reduced
by specified tax preferences).
108. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 309-10, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2349.
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passive income netting concept (of Section 4 69(c)(1)) that
flaws Section 469 passive activity loss rules. The discussion be-
low traces the legislative history of the failed minimum tax ap-
proach to solving the tax shelter abuse problem since 1969.
Theoretically, the alternative minimum tax is to work in tan-
dem with the Section 469 passive activity loss rules under TRA
1986 to ensure that all taxpayers pay their fair share.109 Specif-
ically, TRA 1986 adds Section 58(b) which substantially ex-
pands the pre-TRA 1986 minimum tax base by preventing the
Section 469 passive activity loss amount from being deducted
from the minimum tax base. Section 58(b)(3) further provides
that the Section 469 transitional phase-in rules shall not apply
for purposes of the minimum tax.
Accordingly, even though Section 469 will deny only a por-
tion of pre-enactment passive activity losses until 1991, the
new minimum tax will fully disallow any passive activity losses.
Therefore, the minimum tax base will be greatly expanded
through the pre-enactment investment phase-in period. An in-
vestor will be entitled to some phase-in deductions under Sec-
tion 469, but none under minimum tax. Thus, for purposes of
the alternative minimum tax, 100% of the passive activity loss
would be disallowed for pre-enactment interests, even during
the Section 469 phase-in period.
2. Minimum Tax Analysis
Returning to the tax policy analysis of the retroactive appli-
cation of the passive activity loss under Section 469, one might
argue that the same defect exists here, although with consider-
ably less force. Since 1969, wealthy and sophisticated taxpay-
ers have known about minimum tax and, through inartful
congressional draftmanship, have been able to avoid paying a
minimum tax. It is difficult to believe that even those astute
few believed that their bonanza was anything more than transi-
tory. Accordingly, requiring such a taxpayer to prospectively
pay a fair share of the tax burden does not seem offensive from
a tax policy standpoint. These astute taxpayers were most
likely aware, or should have been aware, that they were not
playing on a level field since 1969.
109. An alternative minimum tax is paid if it is greater than the regular tax and
essentially applies a separate independent tax rate to an expanded definition of in-
come. I.R.C. § 55(a) (West Supp. 1987).
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The real problem, of course, is that since Section 58(b)
adopts the disallowance mechanism of Section 469, it suffers
from the same malfunction-ineffectiveness against the
wealthy taxpayers who have passive losses to shield their pas-
sive income. Its principal application is to persons that have
service-based income and portfolio income, such as dividends
and interest, who invested in pre-TRA 1986 activities which
produced a tax loss as an essential ingredient of their return.
Consequently, during the TRA 1986 phase-in period (1987
through 1990), the alternative minimum tax will go beyond the
reach of Section 469 to penalize persons who made pre-TRA
1986 tax shelter investments. This will occur because the full
amount of passive activity losses will be subject to the mini-
mum tax base. As noted, TRA 1986's impact may not be too
harsh because these taxpayers may have had no legitimate in-
terest in not paying a minimum tax before TRA 1986's enact-
ment. The minimum tax's continuing inability to truly require
those with substantial economic income to pay a fair share of
the tax burden, however, is clearly a defect since that is the
principal purpose of the tax. Section 469 curbs the prolifera-
tion of tax shelters, and does so nicely, without the help of the
alternativ minimum-, tax. The minimum tax's purpose seems,
as it historically has been, is to ensure that all taxpayers with
substantial income pay a fair share of taxes.
Since Section 58 adopts the aggregation rules of Section
469, it may not entirely accomplish its purpose. As noted
under the Section 469 discussion, taxpayers will still be able to
offset substantial economic non-portfolio passive income with
passive tax shelter losses generated from sources such as lever-
aged real estate. Arguably, the wealthy are thus favored by
TRA 1986 because, as a group, they are the most likely to be in
a tax position to benefit from leveraged real estate transac-
tions. As such, they may be in a unique position to take advan-
tagie of any price devaluation in real estate likely to occur
under TRA 1986. Finally, they will also be able to hold their
assets longer, until the non-tax economic returns of real estate
increases, as discussed earlier. Thus, this group of taxpayers
may get favored tax treament, which in turn may assist the
well-informed wealthy investor in capitalizing on an economic
advantage from any anticipated TRA 1986 asset devaluation.
The foregoing discussion of the interplay between the mini-
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mum tax and Section 469 highlights a principal defect in the
combined statutory scheme. After TRA 1986, and particularly
during the Section 469 phase-in period from 1987 through
1991, the principal defect of the combined effort is the flexibil-
ity afforded select taxpayers to avoid the application of the
statutes through the passive activity aggregation rules found in
Section 469 and repeated in the minimum tax provisions.
Criticism is much simpler to generate than solutions. Con-
gress has a long record of sustained effort in attempting to cre-
ate an effective minimum tax which indicates that even with all
its problems, the minimum tax is likely to remain a permanent
feature of our tax system for quite some time.
3. Legislative History
A review of the history of the minimum tax precipitates the
conclusion that designing an effective minimum tax rule has
not been easy for Congress. Beginning in 1969, Congress re-
jected the passive loss limitation approach of TRA 1986 in
favor of a minimum tax. When experience revealed that the
minimum tax provisions were ineffective, Congress attempted
to cure the problem by amending the statutes; however, TRA
1986 and the discussion indicate that Congress has not yet
been completely successful. The minimum tax provisions
need more work if they are to reach their goal of insuring that
all taxpayers bear a fair share of the tax burden. One amend-
ment which may help this effort is the elimination of the ability
of taxpayers to use the passive activity aggregation rules for
minimum tax purposes.
Since 1969, Congress has tried many times to implement ef-
fective minimum tax provisions. The long series of statutory
amendments following the 1969 introduction of the minimum
tax is evidence of Congress' lack of success. The amendments
in 1974, 1976, 1981, 1982, 1984, and finally in 1986 were all
motivated by a perceived ineffectiveness of the minimum tax.
In fact, during the very period in which Congress was attempt-
ing to strengthen the minimum tax, the proliferation of tax
shelters became the most widespread. Of course, tax shelter
abuse was more likely the fault of an income tax system which
was oriented to tax preference deductions rather than a weak
minimum tax. It is odd, however, that tax shelter abuse should
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mature so markedly during the same time that the minimum
tax was enacted and strengthened.
It is also interesting that the House consistently proposed
more stringent efforts in these areas than the Senate and yet, in
the final analysis of TRA 1986, the Senate proposed the Sec-
tion 469 rules which were discussed in the 1969 Treasury pro-
posals, adopted by the House in 1969, but rejected by the
Senate. Instead, the Senate adopted the minimum tax ap-
proach in 1969.
The minimum tax was not an entirely new concept even in
1969 when it was proposed by the Senate and adopted by Con-
gress. During the Johnson Administration, and arguably ear-
lier, it became apparent that selected taxpayers were availing
themselves of tax preferences to the alarming extent that their
otherwise significant tax liabilities were reduced to low levels
that were simply unacceptable under equitable tax policy con-
siderations. 10 To remedy this situation, the Treasury pro-
posed a new graduated alternative minimum tax with a rate
from 7% to 35% which would be applied to an expanded tax
base. The expanded tax base was comprised of taxable income
increased by four tax preferences ("Johnson-Treasury
Proposal"). I I I
The Johnson-Treasury Proposal also introduced an alloca-
tion of deductions concept, the first noticeable attempt to pre-
vent preference related deductions from reducing taxable
income. Under this concept, an individual was required to al-
locate certain non-business expense deductions" t2 between
taxable and preference income. The result was that such de-
ductions were only deductible to the extent allocable to taxa-
110. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., repinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1645.
111. Id. The Johnson-Treasury Proposal isolated four essential income tax areas
whose preferential treatment under current law were most significantly responsible
for disparate tax treatment among individuals. Corporations were not yet the subject
of attack. The four preferential treatment areas were: (i) the Section 1202 net long-
term capital gain exclusion with the Section 1201 alternative of taxing the entire gain
at 25 percent; (ii) tax-exempt interest income on state and local government bonds;
(iii) the exclusion resulting from percentage depletion in excess of the capital in-
vested in the ownership of qualified natural resources; and (iv) the untaxed apprecia-
tion inherent in charitable donations of appreciated property to the extent deductible
under Section 170.
112. Id. The non-business deductions required to be allocated were most of the
itemized deductions including interest, taxes, casualty losses, charitable contribu-
tions, medical expenses, and cooperative housing expenses.
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ble income. This is the same approach utilized by Section 265,
which prevents the deduction of expenses related to non-taxa-
ble income such as exempt interest income. It was also similar
to the 1969 House approach under proposed Section 302 dis-
cussed above.' 1
3
Although this aspect of the Johnson-Treasury Proposal was
adopted by the House in 1969,114 it seems appropriate that it
was never adopted by the Senate which preferred a minimum
tax approach." 5 It seems inappropriate to limit the deduction
for tax preference items by non-preferential itemized deduc-
tions, such as casualty losses and medical expenses, since these
deductions are entirely unrelated to the production of the tax-
exempt income. In addition, itemized deductions presumably
have a separate and distinct policy base that support their de-
ductibility independent of whether a taxpayer is engaged in tax
shelter activity.
a. Tax Reform Act of 1969
The Johnson-Treasury Proposal was the basis of subsequent
Nixon Administration submissions to Congress and was ulti-
mately the foundation of the add-on minimum tax under the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 ("TRA 1969"),116 the first major leg-
islative assault on the excessive use of tax incentives. 1 7 In
1969, the problem of those with significant economic income
avoiding a fair share of the tax burden was so severe that Con-
gress endeavored to ensure that tax incentives in the form of
tax relief would not reduce the allocable tax burden of re-
sponding taxpayers below the levels which would be imposed
if equitable considerations alone were determinative. On Au-
gust 2, 1969, Wilbur Mills, Congressman from Arkansas and
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee submit-
ted the following report as part of TRA 1969:
113. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
114. See H.R. CONF, REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2392, 2416.
115. Id.
116. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (83 Stat.) 1645.
117. Id, An add-on minimum tax is a minimum tax that is added to regular tax
liability, whereas an alternative minimum tax is paid in lieu of the regular tax if it is
greater than the latter. Conceptually, the alternative minimum tax encompasses a
much broader definition of economic income than the add-on minimum tax, which is
a penalty tax on the excessive use of tax preferences.
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From time to time, since the enactment of the present in-
come tax, over 50 years ago, various tax incentives or pref-
erences have been added to the internal revenue laws.
Increasingly, in recent years, taxpayers with substantial in-
comes have found ways of gaining tax advantages from pro-
visions placed in the code primarily to aid some limited
segment of the economy. In fact, in many cases they have
found ways to pile one advantage on top of another. Your
committee believes that this is an intolerable situation. It
should not have been possible for 154 individuals with ad-
justed gross incomes of $200,000 or more to pay no income
tax. Ours is primarily a self-assessment system. If taxpayers
are generally to pay their taxes on a voluntary basis they
must feel that these taxes are fair. Moreover, only by shar-
ing the tax burden on a fair basis is it possible to keep the
tax burden at a level which is tolerable for all taxpayers."
l8
To a limited degree, Congress responded in 1969 by curtailing
tax incentives extended by specific statutes."l 9 Obviously this
approach was limited since, if extended to eliminate perceived
abuses, the incentives that Congress wanted to protect would
also be destroyed.
Accordingly, Congress also partially adopted the Johnson-
Treasury Proposal siechanism of an add-on minimum tax
("AOMT") to reconcile the tax policy objective of greater eq-
uity while continuing tax preferences. 120 Such a mechanism
would theoretically limit the proportion of a taxpayer's income
that might be sheltered by tax preference incentives. In its
primitive 1969 form, the AOMT was a penalty tax operating
outside the existing tax framework. It established independent
tax rates and a newly formed tax base. 12' It has been critized
as being ineffectual, complex, and unfair. 22
The AOMT was unfair because it imposed an equal penalty
on all preferences, regardless of the magnitude of the prefer-
ence underlying the tax incentive itself. Consequently, the
118. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1645.
119. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (83 Stat.) 509, 624-26 (section 1251, which requires the re-
capture of excess farm losses; and section 63(d), limiting the deductibility of excess
investment interest).
120. See id. 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 623-30.
121. Id.
122. See Coven, supra note 74, at 1096.
[Vol. 14
32
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss1/1
TRA 1986
slight preference produced by the excess of accelerated depre-
ciation over straight-line depreciation on short useful life
property was the same as the penalty for the much greater cap-
ital gains exclusion preference.
Moreover, the 1969 AOMT was somewhat regressive and
was inequitably based on a tax rate on preferences that was not
integrated with the regular tax rate and computation. 23 Not
only was the separate rate schedule largely indefensible from a
policy standpoint, but it also unnecessarily created complexity.
In essence, a taxpayer was required to calculate two separate
rate schedules.
Congress created the 1969 AOMT by adding Sections 56,
57, and 58, all effective for taxable years ending after Decem-
ber 31, 1969.124 Both individuals and corporations were sub-
ject to the tax.' 2 5 The 1969 AOMT was calculated by applying
a 10% rate to the minimum tax base, which was computed as
the sum of all specified tax preferences reduced by the sum of
the regular tax liability paid and an exemption amount.' 26
This exemption amount varied depending upon filing status
123. Id.
124. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 at §§ 56-58, 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (83 Stat.) 623-30 (reported in the Act as § 301).
125. See id, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 623.
126. Id. The tax preference items included in the original minimum tax base
were:
(i) excess investment interest, which was defined as the amount of the excess of
investment interest expense over the sum of the net investment income and the
amount, if any, by which the deductions allowable under Sections 162, 163, 164(a)(1)
or (2), and Section 212 attributable to property subject to a net lease exceeds the
gross rental income produced by such property (this item of tax preference applied
only to individuals, Subchapter S corporations and personal holding companies until
1972);
(ii) excess accelerated depreciation on real property which exceeded the depre-
ciation deduction which would have been allowable for the taxable year had the tax-
payer depreciated the property under the straight-line method for each taxable year
of its useful life;
(iii) accelerated depreciation on personal property subject to a net lease in the
amount by which the actual deduction exceeded the amount that would have been
allowable for the taxable year had the taxpayer depreciated the property under the
straight-line method for each taxable year of its useful life (Section 57(c)(1) defined
net leases as property subject to a lease in which the sum of the deductions of the
lease with respect to the property which were allowable solely by reason of Section
162 is less than 15% of the rental income produced by such property or the lessor is
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but was $30,000 for taxpayers filing a joint return.' 27
b. Tax Reform Act of 1976
By 1975, it was clear that the 1969 AOMT provisions had
not accomplished their goal of ensuring that high income indi-
viduals and corporations pay a minimum tax on their tax pref-
erences. The Senate noted in the Tax Reform Act of 1976
("TRA 1976") that the 1969 AOMT had not achieved its origi-
nal goal and, as a consequence, high income individuals were
still able to avoid paying a minimum income tax. 128 Moreover,
the Senate noted that the 1969 AOMT was principally a tax on
only one type of preferred income, the excluded 50% of long-
term capital gains, which then constituted approximately
seven-eighths of the income in the minimum tax base.' 2
9
Notwithstanding the 1969 AOMT, the appetite of the Ameri-
can taxpayer for tax preferences became so great that TRA
either guaranteed a specified return or is guaranteed, in whole or in part, against loss
of income);
(iv) amortization of certified pollution control facilities in an amount by which
the Section 169 deduction exceeded the Section 167 deduction;
(v) amortization of railroad rolling stock in an amount under which th Section
i84 deduction exceeded the Section 167 depreciation deduction;
(vi) the bargain element in a stock option, taxed under Sections 422 or 424 in
an amount by which the fair market value of the share at the time of the exercise
exceeded the option price;
(vii) bad debt deductions of financial institutions (this was a corporate prefer-
ence item in an amount by which the deduction allowable for the taxable year for
reasonable addition to a reserve for bad debts exceeded the amount that would have
been allowable had the institution maintained its bad debt reserve for all taxable
years on the basis of an actual experience);
(viii) depletion deduction taken for the year over the cost of the property re-
duced for depletion taken in prior years;
(ix) excess amortization over straight-line amounts of rehabilitation expendi-
tures; and
(x) capital gains preference (for non-corporate taxpayers, the preference was
equal to one-half the net long-term capital gain to the extent it exceeded the net
short-term capital loss and in the case of corporate taxpayers, an amount equal to the
excess of the net long-term capital gain over net short-term capital loss multiplied by
a fraction, the denominator of which was the regular corporate tax rate minus the
capital gains rate applicable to corporations). See id. at § 57, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 581-83.
127. Id. at § 56(a), 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 623 (current version
at I.R.C. § 55(d)(1)(A) (1986)).
128. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws (90 Stat.) 1520, 3475.
129. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 109, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG
& ADMIN. NEWS 3545.
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1976 enacted special provisions to deal with tax preferences
created by tax shelters.1
30
The Senate defined targeted tax shelters as "investments
which permit persons to claim deductions that under a precise
definition of income would be reclaimed in later years." 1 3 '
These accelerated deductions enabled the investor to deduct a
loss against unrelated ordinary income. Generally, the use of
accelerated deductions in one year means that in future years
the investor will have less deductions than under the straight-
line method, but still receives the benefit of tax deferral, the
equivalent of an interest-free loan from the federal govern-
ment. Also, the tax rate may be lower in that future year than
in the year in which the accelerated deductions were
claimed.t3 2 In effect, tax shelters, as a separate form of tax
preference, were creating the identical problems that the ear-
lier tax preferences had created which were the genesis of the
1969 AOMT. Thus, by enabling high income individuals to
avoid tax, tax shelters were impairing the equity of the tax
system.
Moreover, Congress began to express concern that some in-
vestments were being undertaken not because of their eco-
nomic merits, but because of the tax savings they were
generating which resulted in an artificial resource allocation
system.13 3 Therefore, under TRA 1976, Congress strength-
ened the 1969 AOMT by adding three new items of tax prefer-
ence to the minimum tax base. 34  These changes were
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 623.
134. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 110, repinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWs 3545-48. The new preferences were:
(i) excess itemized deductions in an amount equal to the taxpayers' itemized
deductions (other than the deductions for medical expenses and casualty losses) in
excess of 60% of adjusted gross income reduced by the deductions for medical ex-
penses and casualty losses;
(ii) intangible drilling costs in an amount equal to the excess of deductible in-
tangible drilling costs paid or incurred in connection with productive oil and gas
wells over the amount that would have been deductible if such costs had been capital-
ized and either amortized over a ten-year period or deducted over the lives of the
wells as a cost depletion; and
(iii) accelerated depreciation on personal property which, treated as an item of
tax preference the accelerated depreciation on personal property subject to a net
lease (which was expanded to cover all leased personal property).
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generally effective for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1975.135
c. Revenue Act of 1978
In the Revenue Act of 1978 ("RA 1978"),136 Congress re-
sponded to a sluggish economy and investment level by enact-
ing changes to encourage capital formation. This approach
weakened the 1969 and 1976 AOMT base. Congress believed
that the current capital gains tax in effect at that time, which
included two levels of analysis, was counterproductive because
it discouraged investment and discouraged the sale of appreci-
ated assets to such an extent that it was not providing as much
revenue as would result from a lower capital gains rate. 37 The
rules regarding taxation of capital gains involved a regular tax,
minimum tax, alternative tax, and a maximum tax.' 38 This
combination was viewed as unnecessarily complex. 39 More-
over, the capital gains tax was viewed as inequitable to the ex-
tent that gains which were taxed represented only inflationary
increases in value as opposed to real dollar increases in value
of the disposed asset.
140
In concert with these changes, Congress believed that the
existing miiium tax on capital gains had adversely affected
capital formation and that the purpose for which the minimum
tax was enacted could be better achieved by implementation of
a separate minimum tax on capital gains which would be paya-
ble only to the extent that it exceeded a taxpayer's regular tax
liability. 14' Thus, Congress enacted a dual minimum tax pro-
cedure under which the 1969 and 1976 AOMT no longer ap-
plied to capital gains and excess itemized deductions.
42
These two items of tax preference were excluded from the
AOMT base and formed part of a new alternative minimum tax
("AMT") which generally applied to taxable years beginning
135. Id. at 114, 1976 U.S. CODE CON. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3549.
136. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (92 Stat.) 2763.
137. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 6761, 6778.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. STAFF OF JoINT COMMITFEE ON TAXATION, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, 261-62 (Joint Comm. Print 1978).
142. Id.
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after 1978.' 4 3
C. Alternative Minimum Tax
After 1979, non-corporate taxpayers were thus subject to
two distinct minimum taxes. Under Section 56, non-corporate
taxpayers were subject to an AOMT as computed under prior
law with the modifications discussed. They were also subject
to an AMT under Section 55. In the final analysis, the new
AMT added by Section 55 was viewed as a true alternative tax
in the sense that the tax was paid only when it exceeded regu-
lar tax liability, which now included any AOMT liability from
TRA 1969 and TRA 1976.144
The AMT base was computed by adding back to taxable in-
come the preference items for adjusted itemized deductions
and capital gains deductions for the taxable year. 145 Consis-
tent with this principle, both the adjusted itemized deductions
and capital gains deduction preferences were excluded from
treatment as items of tax preference for the purposes of the
AOMT under Section 56.146 The AMT was imposed according
to a new graduated rate schedule that ranged from 0% to
257,.14 7
1. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
By 1981, Congress believed that further statutory modifica-
tions were needed beyond those created by RA 1978 to speed
and encourage economic recovery and, in response, it enacted
President Reagan's Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
143. Id. at 267.
144. Id. at 262.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 261, n. 1.
147. Id. at 263. Consistent with modifications to the capital gain rates and modifi-
cation of regular and minimum taxation provisions on capital gains, the maximum
tax provisions under section 1348 were modified under RA 1978 to be more
favorable with respect to capital gains tax preference items. Prior to RA 1978, the
maximum marginal tax rate applicable to taxable income from personal services was
generally 50%. However, the amount of personal service income eligible for the
maximum tax was reduced by the amount of an individual's tax preferences for the
year, and under prior law this offset reduction included the amount of an individual's
capital gains tax preference. As a consequence, RA 1978 removed capital gains tax
preference as a deduction offset of the amount of personal service income eligible for
the maximum tax rate.
1988]
37
Bishop: Loss Limitation and Individual Minimum Tax after the Tax Reform A
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW
("ERTA 198 1").148 Congress believed that substantial tax rate
reductions were central to economic recovery. 149 Thus, margi-
nal tax rates were reduced from a high of 70% to 50%.150 The
rate reduction impact was phased-in over a period of time.' 5 '
Moreover, in order to conform the 1978 AMT to the reduction
in the maximum regular tax on net capital gains, ERTA 1981
reduced the top maximum tax rate on capital gains from 25%
to 20%.152
2. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
Notwithstanding the enactment of the 1969 AOMT, its ex-
pansion in 1976, and its contraction in 1978 and 1981, Con-
gress was dissatisfied with the manner in which wealthy
individuals continued to avoid paying any taxes through the
use of exclusions, deductions, and credits. Perhaps Congress
believed that it had acted too generously in 1978 and 1981. As
a result, Congress enacted the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA 1982"),153 and once again revised
the minimum tax rules rather substantially.
TEFRA 1982 congressional revisions to minimum tax provi-
sions had two goals. The first was to simplify taxpayer compu-
tations of the tax by repealing the separately calculated AOMT
provisions, thereby leaving only the AMT provisions.' 54 The
second goal was to provide a tax reduction for many middle
income taxpayers who were paying a minimum tax on some
preference income, but who also had substantial amounts of
non-preference income.' 55 Congress believed that by combin-
ing all the tax preferences from the AMT and from the pre-
148. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (95 Stat.) 172.
149. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 1981, 17 (Joint Comm. Print
1981).
150. Id. at 28.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 30. Accordingly, under the Act, the alternative minimum tax rate is
10% for amounts, from $20,000 through $60,000, and 20% for amounts in excess of
$60,000.
153. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (96 Stat.) 324.
154. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITrEE ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSI-
BILITY ACT OF 1982, 17 (Joint Comm. Print 1982).
155. Id.
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existing AOMT and by focusing the minimum tax on high in-
come individuals, the modified AMT would increase the mini-
mum tax liability only for targeted high income taxpayers with
incomes in excess of $100,000.156
Generally, the tax base for the 1982 AMT was an individual's
adjusted gross income plus the taxpayer's tax preference for
the year, reduced by certain deductions.1 57 This amount was
then reduced by a $30,000 exemption ($40,000 in the case of
married taxpayers filing a joint return or a surviving spouse)
and was subject to a minimum tax rate of 20%.158 The 20%
rate was added under the conference agreement between the
House and the Senate. The original Senate position contained
a minimum tax rate of 10% on minimum tax base of up to
$20,000 and 20% in excess of $20,000.159
The preferences for the 1982 AMT were the same as the
preferences under prior law with some revisions. The deduc-
tion for long-term capital gains covered under the 1978 AMT
was added as an item of tax preference, and the adjusted item-
ized deduction preference of the 1978 AMT and the prefer-
ence for amortization of child care facilities were repealed.
160
Several new preferences were added to the 1982 AMT, includ-
ing the $100 dividend exclusion, the all-savers interest exclu-
sion, the 15% net interest exclusion, the excess of expensing
for mining exploration and development costs, research and
development costs, and magazine circulation expenditures.' 6'
Finally, a preference was added for the excess of the fair mar-
ket value of stock received upon the exercise of an incentive
stock option over the option price. 162 The important incentive
stock option preference was added in the conference agree-
ment but was not contained in the original Senate proposal. 163
156. S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 781, 851.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 109, 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 877.
160. H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 475, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1254.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Act of July 18, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (98 Stat.) 494.
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3. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
Under the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 ("DRA 1984"),164
certain technical and clarifying amendments were made to the
AMT provisions. 65 The most important minimum tax revi-
sions under DRA 1984 occurred with respect to corporate tax
preference cutbacks and not with respect to the individual
AMT provisions. 166
D. Tax Policy Process Analysis
If the scenario presented is correct in that the aggregate net-
ting of passive activity income and loss is a critical defect of
Section 469, which has been incorporated in the AMT provi-
sions, it is painfully clear that future legislation will be needed
to continually correct the current and future tax abuses which
have been created by the deficiencies of past legislation. This
continuing spiral of seemingly never-ending tax legislation cre-
ates a very real problem for tax practitioners and their clients.
Continual legislation breeds complexity. Complexity trans-
lates into compliance problems for administrators and taxpay-
ers alike.
Perhaps all this says something critical about the legislative
tax policy process as it relates to the creation of tax prefer-
ences as a method of attracting private investment capital. If
one divides the analytic hemisphere of incentive industries into
two groups, asset-based and service-based, a few points be-
come self-evident.
First, except for special services as they relate to ultimate as-
set or product development (such as research and develop-
ment expenditures), most legislative preferences are extended
to asset-based industries for obvious reasons. The radiations
of encouraging private capital to purchase an asset would in
theory create a demand for the asset which in turn means there
is an expansive ripple effect through the economy on all the
component jobs and products necessary to produce the asset
necessary to satisfy the capital demand for the asset.
If the asset is a wasting asset, that is one whose value to its
164. Id.
165. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 923, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1542.
166. Id. at 924, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1542.
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owner is premised upon its intrinsic value to produce other as-
sets, then perhaps capital acquisition stimuli in our tax system,
such as investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation, do
legitimately stimulate demand for the acquisition of such wast-
ing capital assets. A lingering question must always be
whether or not such incentives are economically efficient. It
can be argued that they merely accelerate, as opposed to cre-
ate, demand for such assets. If true, this implies that the re-
sulting economic upswing may be temporary as demand from
one period has simply been borrowed from another, thereby
creating an up-today down-tomorrow syndrome.
A precise economic analysis is beyond the scope of this
work, yet one cannot help but wonder if tax incentives in the
wasting asset area are simply not as potentially harmful to our
system as those in the non-wasting asset area. Wasting asset
incentives tend to be related to a calculated impact on our
economy, usually a demand-side effort to reverse or stem a
negative economic downturn. For purposes of this work,
whether such measures are more beneficial than other non-tax
related economic stimuli is not known. Yet, it is hard to see
that major casualties are created by this process. One tends to
focus more on efficiencies as opposed to casualties.
In this area, perhaps the tax incentive goal should be to in-
crease the after tax yield of owning the wasting asset. This can
be accomplished with some combined variant of expensing of
part of the wasting asset and allowing economic depreciation
with respect to the remaining cost of the asset. 167 This process
creates an atmosphere of tax neutrality among wasting asset
investment choices. The rate of return of owning all such as-
sets increases to a like amount without creating preferences
among such assets. Hopefully, such tax incentives do not alter
the pre-tax yield on such assets but merely impact the after tax
yield. 168
With non-wasting assets, such as real estate, however, pref-
erential industry tax incentives are generally designed to at-
tract private investment capital to create demand for real
estate, which in theory stimulates building and building com-
167. See Harberger, Tax Neutrality in Investment Incentives, in THE ECONOMICS OF
TAXATION 299, 300-01 (H. Aaron & M. Boskin ed. 1980).
168. See Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 TAX L. REv. 483, 499
(1985).
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ponent construction and hence jobs. When user demand be-
gins to dwindle, vacancy rates in commercial and residential
real estate theoretically increase and Congress returns to the
well to cut the incentives and, thus the demand for new real
estate, until user demand comes more in line with real estate
supply.
In this way, Congress artificially stimulates asset demand for
real estate when in fact consumer user demand for the use of
real estate will not stimulate the demand for itself because the
short run pre-tax yield of the investment in such real estate is
not sufficient to attract market capital. In this sense, tax incen-
tives in the non-wasting area tend to be more related to social
goals (ensuring adequate housing for those who cannot afford
to pay rents high enough to create demand for the new hous-
ing) than economic goals.
This focuses on the fact that a major component of rate of
return ownership of a non-wasting asset is the resale value.
These types of assets are purchased for resale unlike wasting
assets which are purchased for their production of income un-
til the end of their economic life cycle. It is of course true that
in a world without taxes, the market will adjust the prices of
these assets until they are nearly even, given equivalent risk
quotients, or the lower rate of return asset will disappear from
the market place. But if the lower rate of return asset has a
longer range social utility which counter balances the shorter
range market decision, the continued existence of the asset
may be worthwhile in a non-economic sense.
In these circumstances, it is difficult to critisize Congress for
"saving" the asset by enhancing the after tax yield of the in-
vestment. Yet a closer scrutiny is necessary to ensure that it is
understood who bears the ultimate risk for the tax incentive in
reality. The problem deserves serious thought.
What should be recognized is that, in effect Congress is
shifting the responsibility for the economic benefits of such
housing from the renters, who now enjoy lower rents, to the
private capital market, which now enjoys a higher after-tax rate
of return through ownership. The problem is that ultimately,
Congress will pull the plug on the incentive, as it did in TRA
1986. When that occurs, those owning real estate purchased
with those new incentives will find themselves saddled with an
asset they cannot resell under the same conditions under
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which they purchased it because Congress has changed the tax
incentives that the new buyer may enjoy.
The basic fairness of this mechanism may be suspect. At the
very least it deserves serious thought. It is easy to be critical of
the mechanism if it creates traps for the unwary investment
community caught in the wrong legislative disincentive cycle.
One needs only compare legislation since 1969 to understand
that Congress goes through rather obvious incentive and disin-
centive legislative swings. In 1978 and 1981, Congress was
very incentive oriented. In 1969, 1976, 1982, and particularly
1986, Congress was of a different mind.
Who should bear the responsibility for these shifts in moods
and how does a practitioner help the client deal with them?
Certainly transitional rules, however artfully drafted, are not
likely to cure the problem. 169 Perhaps a fair solution would be
to put sunset provisions on all such tax incentives in the non-
wasting asset area, but it would probably be ineffective. Once
again, no investor would buy into the incentive knowing that it
would disappear on a fixed date for the reasons discussed
above. Therefore the incentive would be, or at least should be,
ineffective.
The better answer may be to not utilize these kind of tax
incentives at all for non-wasting assets. When economics of
the investment hinge upon a resale of the asset as with real
estate, the investor who bought the asset under the tax incen-
tive system and must resell in a non-tax incentive system will
always be a loser in the short run. Perhaps in this area direct
government subsidy versus tax incentives needs to be more
fully analyzed.
CONCLUSION
Although the passive activity loss rules of Section 469 will be
somewhat effective in curbing tax shelter abuses, its aggrega-
tion principles (expressed in Section 469(c)(1)) greatly inhibit
169. See generally Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revi-
sion, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977); Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99
HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986) (authors discuss effectiveness and appropriateness of vari-
ous legal transitions in various contexts, including wasting and non-wasting assets).
It is questionable, however, whether any legal transition can fairly correct the prob-
lem discussed in the text, which leads to the conclusion that in this area Congress
may be better off abandoning the tax incentive approach.
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its effectiveness, and its largely retroactive impact may be un-
fair. The 1969 limitation on loss rules appeared to be much
more effective because they were imposed on a per activity ba-
sis. The new passive activity loss preference item of Section
58(b) appears wholly ineffective in achieving its goal of ensur-
ing that those with substantial economic incomes pay their fair
share of tax liability.
It would appear that taken with TRA 1986, the new rate re-
duction and Section 469 PAL rules curb tax shelter abuses for
all but the most wealthy. TRA 1986, however, not only fails to
assure an effective minimum tax, but it also reduces the tax
burden on the wealthy through massive rate cuts. These rate
cuts benefit many wealthy taxpayers who did not engage in
sheltering prior to TRA 1986. One can only hope that the
minimum tax provisions will be revised in future tax legislation
to reflect a per activity rule.
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